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SUMMARY
In the article, the author focused on three theoretical and philosophical issues of the judicial 
enforcement law in Poland, connected with the new enforcement acts which entered into force on 
1 January 2019. First, the judicial enforcement proceedings were presented as an element of the law 
application process. The axiological dimension of this law, the place and function of a court bailiff in 
the law application process and the introduction of general clauses, combined with the basic values of 
the court enforcement law in the form of efficiency, effectiveness and reliability, form the new picture 
of the judicial enforcement law. Secondly, the problem of a general clause as a “carrier” of extralegal 
criteria was discussed, which takes an important place in the process of enforcement law application 
in the new bailiff’s law. There is the special role of the “public interest” and the “interest of justice” 
clauses as normative constructions introduced by the legislator to judicial enforcement. Thirdly, an 
attempt was made to answer the question about the presence and possible limits of discretion (free 
decision-making) of a court bailiff in the surrounding of the new axiology of enforcement law, and es-
pecially the formulation of this issue in the process of operative interpretation of law by a court bailiff.
Keywords: law axiology; judicial enforcement law; law application process; general clause; public 
interest; interest of justice; bailiff’s discretion
 
INTRODUCTION
The following paper attempts to present the axiological determinants of en-
forcement proceedings as a specific kind of the decision-making process in which 
the sphere of assessments and values contributes to the law axiology issues in 





general and provides an important source for building the legal order, especially 
for shaping the enforcement law system in the legal practice.
In Poland, the philosophical aspects of judicial enforcement law have been 
overlooked both in the legal doctrine and in the relevant court decisions so far. 
Nevertheless, in enforcement proceedings these issues are the focus of enforcement 
law axiology, especially values and goals pursued in these proceedings. The actions 
of institutions applying enforcement law (bailiffs) are directed at implementation 
of a number of these values. Assuming that court enforcement bodies are function-
ing within the broadly understood process of law application and that the actions 
undertaken by them have a decision-making value (of varying degrees), while the 
enforcement law sources are not free from gaps and extralegal structures (general 
clause), such an approach poses an additional question about the discretion of these 
bodies in the aspect of their decision-making freedom and its limitations.
JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS OF APPLICATION LAW. 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE
Polish enforcement law can be analyzed as two different types: judicial en-
forcement law and administrative enforcement law. Such division is justified by the 
existence of two types of law application1: judicial and non-judicial (which mostly 
relates to administrative issues)2. Administrative enforcement law concerns the 
cases with a state body like a tax office or the Social Security Institution involved3. 
In judicial enforcement law, both parties are usually private, and the main role here 
is the obligatory enforcement of civil law norms4.
A bailiff is a Polish public officer serving as an executive body in judicial en-
forcement law. A Polish bailiff works under the district court’s jurisdiction in his 
or her own law office5. The basic responsibility of a bailiff is to execute court de-
1 See L. Leszczyński, Types of Application of Law and Decision Making Model, „Studia Iuridica 
Lublinensia” 2015, Vol. 24(2), DOI: https://doi.org/10.17951/sil.2015.24.2.27, pp. 27–47.
2 Ibidem, p. 27.
3 The detailed list of enforcement bodies in administrative enforcement proceedings is presented 
in Articles 19 and 20 of the Act of 17 June 1966 on Administrative Proceedings in Administration 
(Journal of Laws 1966, No. 24, item 151 as amended).
4 We should point to these cases where a party is the Treasury or a public administration body 
which are also subject to judicial enforcement. This pertains mostly to these situations where public 
law claims are the object of enforcement (financial penalties or enforcement cases handed over to 
a court bailiff following the so-called concurrence of judicial and administrative enforcement).
5 Currently, the status of a court bailiff is regulated in Article 2 section 1 of the Act of 22 March 
2018 on Court Bailiffs (Journal of Laws 2018, item 771 as amended): “A bailiff is a public officer 
operating at a district court”, and in Article 3 section 1: “A bailiff is a public authority body who 
performs actions in enforcement proceedings and proceedings to secure claims”.
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cisions: in pecuniary and non-pecuniary claims, in securing claims, bank accounts, 
inheritances, in making inventory lists, serving in court orders and recording the 
factual state of belongings6.
Judicial enforcement proceedings, as a part of law application, are a continua-
tion to the right of access to court and supplement the decision-making process in 
the procedural, theoretical and philosophical dimensions. This stage is characterized 
by efficiency, effectiveness and reliability. These three values are clearly manifested 
in the Judicial Enforcement Law7. As a result, the new policy of enforcement law is 
developing, and it influences the bailiffs’ work and imposes the necessity to respect 
the axiological conditions of law8.
It cannot be overlooked that the recent changes in enforcement law are strongly 
connected with introducing the general clauses referring to “the public interest” 
and “the interest of justice”9 which equally contribute to a bailiff’s work and the 
application of enforcement law in general.
Since 1 January 2019, Poland has introduced two new Acts in judicial enforce-
ment law10. One of the Acts refers to court bailiffs11 and the other Act is connected 
with the financial system of judicial enforcement law12.
It is necessary to point out the fact that even the smallest shift in law influences 
the axiological foundation. In accordance with the concept of axiological changes 
in law – an idea that has been discussed many times in theory of law13 – the notable 
variations in the whole system of Polish judicial enforcement have completely al-
6 See Articles 3 and 4 of the Court Bailiff Act.
7 See, especially, Article 1 section 1 (5) of the Court Bailiff Act. The Act specifies: “[…] 5) the 
rules of supervision over bailiffs and bailiff self-government, taking into account the need to ensure 
that the tasks of the state with respect to efficient, effective and reliable judicial enforcement are duly 
fulfilled”.
8 More on axiological issues in law, see T. Barankiewicz, Aksjologiczna problematyka prawa, 
„Roczniki Nauk Prawnych” 2004, Vol. 14(1), pp. 45–58.
9 See Article 2 section 3 of the Court Bailiff Act: “While fulfilling his or her tasks, a bailiff is 
guided by the interest of justice and the public interest”.
10 Before 2019 in the Polish legal system there was only one act regulating judicial enforcement 
law. See Act of 29 August 1997 on Court Bailiffs and Enforcement (Journal of Laws 1997, No. 133, 
item 882 as amended).
11 See Act of 22 March 2018 on Court Bailiffs.
12 See Act of 28 February 2018 on Enforcement Costs (Journal of Laws 2018, item 770 as 
amended).
13 General reflections on the axiological basis in law and on its changes are presented by 
K. Pałecki (O aksjologicznych zmianach w prawie. Referat otwierający obrady XIII Zjazdu Katedr 
Teorii i Filozofii Prawa, [in:] Zmiany społeczne a zmiany w prawie. Aksjologia, konstytucja, integracja 
europejska, red. L. Leszczyński, Lublin 1999, p. 18). As the author notes: “Nevertheless, in the law 
application process this official axiological basis has undergone quite a far-reaching transformation 
with respect to the composition, contents and hierarchy of importance – the transformation connected 
with interpretation made for the purposes of taking specific legal decisions”.





tered the axiological basis. This can mean axiological changes at the core of every 
decision made by a bailiff14. It can also be reflected in the way this branch of law 
is going to be perceived by people whom the law serves.
GENERAL CLAUSES AS THE AXIOLOGICAL BASIS OF 
JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT LAW. THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
VS THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE
The idea of a general clause is a theoretical one and from this point of view it 
is mainly analyzed in the law doctrine15. The lack of a normative definition in the 
Polish legal sources does not preclude the use of this term in the law application 
process (particularly in the process of operative interpretation).
In the legal doctrine, a general clause is defined as “a normative construction 
(included in the text of a legal act) by which the legislator »communicates« with 
a recipient of norms in order to apply extra-legal criteria into any legal decision or 
law-obeying behaviour”16.
In the law application process, the term of a general clause refers to such ideas 
as: good manners, good intentions, justness, public interest, civic interest. In pri-
vate law, the clauses are significantly noticeable in civil law17, where construction 
of abuse of law is the most frequently referred to. In public law, an example of 
applying general clauses is administrative law with Article 7 of the Administrative 
Procedure Code18. The present legal policy proves that judicial enforcement law 
is becoming more and more public19. The new Acts on judicial enforcement with 
14 Ibidem, p. 19.
15 General clauses are discussed the most extensively in theoretical law literature by 
L. Leszczyński who has analyzed this issue many times. See L. Leszczyński, Generalne klauzule 
odsyłające w stosowaniu prawa, Lublin 1986; idem, Tworzenie generalnych klauzul odsyłających, 
Lublin 2000; idem, Generalne klauzule odsyłające – ujęcie teoretycznoprawne, „Annales UMCS 
sectio G (Ius)” 2016, Vol. 63(2), DOI: https://doi.org/10.17951/g.2016.63.2.11, pp. 11–26.
16 See idem, Generalne klauzule odsyłające – ujęcie…, p. 13.
17 See Article 5 of the Act of 23 April 1964 – Civil Code (Journal of Laws 1964, No. 16, item 
93 as amended): “One’s right cannot be exercised in a way contrary to the socio-economic purpose 
of this right or the principles of community life. Such an act or omission of an entitled person is not 
regarded as execution of a right and is not protected”.
18 See Article 7 of the Act of 14 June 1960 – Administrative Procedure Code (Journal of Laws 
1960, No. 30, item 168 as amended): “In the course of the proceedings the public administration 
bodies protect the rule of law and undertake all actions necessary for clarification of the facts in detail 
and for dealing with the case, ex officio or at the parties’ request, taking into consideration the public 
interest and the legitimate interests of citizens”.
19 M. Safjan directly points to the advancing process of private law “publicization”. As he 
emphasizes: “A phenomenon sometimes referred to as publicization of private law has been noted 
for almost 100 years as a process of departing from the classical civil law, the basic ideas of which 
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a bailiff’s position itself and an enforcement fee are the elements which justify this 
opinion. It is also supported by the introduction of a general clause in the process 
of law application.
Since January 2019 in the existing Bailiff Act we can find clauses such as “the 
public interest” and “the interest of justice” which are completely new components 
to the Polish law enforcement system. The legislator introduced a direct reference to 
general clauses in Article 2 section 2 of the Bailiff Act20. They serve as guideposts 
for a bailiff in his or her actions. The legislator imposed on bailiffs the responsibility 
to implement these clauses in the application of law.
A reference to a general clause could be included in the text of a decision (e.g. 
in a response to a complaint where a bailiff refers directly to these clauses as val-
idation of his or her actions).
Will bailiffs refer to these clauses in writing (they could if they wanted to refer 
to them in any formal decision – documentation), or will they treat them more as 
mental guidelines? This will turn out in the course of practice only after some time.
The general clauses are not restricted only to a bailiff as the main enforcement 
body. The court itself can also use them in the process of law application. Such refer-
ences can be found in court orders, but also in written recommendations concerning 
bailiffs and their actions directly21. To conclude, if we want to apply and interpret 
judicial enforcement law, it is impossible not to look at both clauses I mentioned 
and the values carried by them at every stage of the application process.
Theory of law presents various perspectives on the clause of public interest22. 
In general, one can distinguish three different concepts describing the relations 
have been expressed in great codifications of the 19th century. As it is noted, departure from these 
guidelines is demonstrated in the growing interference of the public factor in the sphere which was 
reserved earlier only for autonomous behaviour of individuals, in the regular restriction of the area 
where the private law method is applied to the benefit of public law regulations, that is taking out 
certain segments from the sphere of private law, the increasingly visible infiltration of community 
interest (public interest) in the area of the relations which were traditionally left exclusively to the 
parties, but also in the growing dispersion of institutions and solutions (a phenomenon of private law 
stratification), depending on the narrowly expressed purposes and functions of particular regulations” 
(M. Safjan, Pojęcie i systematyka prawa prywatnego, [in:] System Prawa Prywatnego, t. 1: Prawo 
cywilne – część ogólna, red. M. Safjan, Warszawa 2012, pp. 49–50).
20 “While fulfilling his or her tasks, a bailiff is guided by the interest of justice and the public 
interest”.
21 See Article 759 § 2 of the Act of 17 November 1964 – Civil Procedure Code (Journal of Laws 
1964, No. 43, item 296 as amended): “The Court issues orders to a bailiff ex officio to ensure proper 
execution and removes infringements noticed. Legal opinions expressed by the court in the orders 
issued are binding on the bailiff”.
22 See A. Żurawik, „Interes publiczny”, „interes społeczny” i „interes społecznie uzasadniony”, 
„Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny” 2013, nr 2, p. 60 ff. and the literature cited there-
in. Cf. A. Kalisz, Klauzula moralności (publicznej) w prawie polskim i europejskim jako przykład 
regulacyjnej, ochronnej oraz innowacyjnej funkcji państwa, „Principia” 2013, t. 57, passim.





between public interest and interest of an individual23. The first of these concepts 
presents public interest as superior to interest of an individual24. In the second 
approach (common interest)25 the interest of every single individual together with 
the interest of minorities are highlighted. The third concept takes into account both 
public interest and interest of an individual, but it focuses on values that these two 
have in common26. These values can form the basis of the decision-making process.
The public interest clause has the widest implementation in public law27 where 
the broadly understood state interest plays the leading role (e.g. in administrative, 
tax, constitutional law)28. There is an increasing number of theoretical views which 
argue that neither public interest nor interest of an individual is superior to each 
other. They coexist and, depending on the case character, can be used in law29.
The “new” enforcement law introduces new roles to definitions of such concepts 
as court bailiff, enforcement fee or court and administrative supervision. In this way, 
a public enforcement officer is obligated by law to apply this clause by “his or her 
service” while taking actions. Additionally, the construction of an enforcement fee 
as a public-law fee and re-defined administrative and court supervision (Minister of 
Justice, the Head of a District Court, local enforcement authorities) are attributed 
to changes in enforcement law which make it more public30.
The main task of public interest is to protect “public good” in order to guar-
antee respect for social values accepted by the whole community. This can mean 
protection of other parties not directly engaged in the enforcement procedure. For 




27 See E. Komierzyńska, M. Zdyb, Klauzula  interesu  publicznego  w  działaniach  admi-
nistracji  publicznej, „Annales UMCS sectio G (Ius)” 2016, Vol. 63(2), DOI: https://doi.or-
g/10.17951/g.2016.63.2.161, p. 164.
28 Wprowadzenie do nauk prawnych. Leksykon tematyczny, red. A. Bator, Warszawa 2016, p. 206: 
“This law serves the interests of the state and of self-government legal persons (public interest); the 
legal relations distinguished here are the relations of the subordinate type, that is they are based on 
the competence subordination relations and superiority (asymmetry) of legal subjects. In this law, 
the state is the initiator of actions”.
29 See A. Żurawik, op. cit., p. 60 ff. In the author’s opinion: “Currently, there is not much doubt 
that public interest cannot be arbitrarily deemed superior to individual interest, because the two 
interests must be balanced in every situation”. The presented opinion is justified with the views in 
the doctrine and the judicial practice of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Tribunal. Sim-
ilar views are presented by Z.R. Kmiecik, M. Grzeszczuk and E. Streit-Browarna (Klauzula ge-
neralna interesu społecznego w postępowaniu administracyjnym, sądowoadministracyjnym oraz 
egzekucyjnym w administracji, „Annales UMCS sectio G (Ius)” 2016, Vol. 63(2), DOI: https://doi.
org/10.17951/g.2016.63.2.209, p. 213).
30 See comment to Article 1 of the Court Bailiff Act in: Ustawa o komornikach sądowych. 
Komentarz, red. R. Reiwer, Warszawa 2019, Legalis, passim.
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example, when a company that is a debtor has to close down and reduce the staff 
as a consequence of too oppressive enforcement actions, one must consider the 
interest of the staff as a public good and adjust enforcement actions in order not 
to hurt anyone.
Not only public interest but also the bailiff’s interest, the state’s interest and 
the interest of a party concerned are defined by a Court Bailiff Act. Moreover, they 
all represent public interest to the same extent. Therefore, there is no need to fix 
the hierarchy because each of them respects the idea of protecting “public good”.
An enforcement officer must choose what action to take that is effective and, 
at the same time, safeguards public interest. I want to point out here that there is 
a ban on seizure exceeding the claim in the Civil Procedure Code in Article 799 
§ 1 sentence 4 (“An enforcement authority applies such a mode of execution that is 
the least troublesome for the debtor”) because if it is too oppressive for the debtor 
it does not pursue the intentions of general clauses.
The second clause I am going to present in this article is “the interest of justice” 
clause. It is interesting from the theoretical and philosophical point of view, but 
it also raises a number of questions concerning the practice. They may be hard to 
answer, probably because there is not much practice developed in this new judicial 
enforcement law.
In order to understand the changes better and help answer the questions, we can 
use knowledge and experience from other branches of law. A great example here 
can be case-law developed on the basis of the Polish Criminal Procedure Code that 
is Article 37: “The Supreme Court may, upon the motion of the court having juris-
diction over the case, refer the case to be heard by another court of the same level 
if this is required by the interest of justice”. In these cases court in decision refers 
to the interest of justice in order to guarantee the rightfulness of the proceedings31.
To put the clause into practice we must consider a few articles. In particular, 
Article 2.3 of the Court Bailiff Act which provides that “While taking action, 
a bailiff follows the interest of justice […]”.
When we look at the enforcement procedure as an integral part of the law 
application model with all its stages, we can associate this clause with the right to 
a case in court and initiating enforcement proceedings as a consequence. These 
actions must serve their purpose, namely to effectively execute enforceable titles.
31 See extensive discussion on the role of the interest of justice clause in the criminal proce-
dure: B. Dudzik, Generalne klauzule odsyłające w procesie karnym na przykładzie dobra wymiaru 
sprawiedliwości (uwagi na tle art. 37 k.p.k.), „Annales UMCS sectio G (Ius)” 2016, Vol. 63(2), DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.17951/g.2016.63.2.279, pp. 279–289 and the literature cited therein.





COURT BAILIFF’S DISCRETION IN THE LAW APPLICATION PROCESS. 
THE NEW RESEARCH PERSPECTIVE
Functioning of a court bailiff in the broadly understood justice concept is 
strongly connected with his or her place in judicial law application32.
Reconstruction of the entire law application model (no matter whether judicial 
or administrative) puts it in the final stage of the process leading to concrete-individ-
ual norm realization, one that is pre-specified in enforceable titles (law application 
decision – judgement, decision, payment order).
The actions taken by enforcement officers in the decision-making process are 
of various character. They can be declarative steps, technical activities or research 
work33. The majority of enforcement actions are of declarative character (settle-
ments, regulations or seizures), which means they automatically add the discretion 
element into bailiffs’ work.
Let us leave the detailed considerations on the discretion term and focus on the 
fact that discretion, its relationship with judicial discretion and its limitation are the 
major elements in the legal order according to Polish and foreign legal doctrine34.
 For the purpose of this article, the discretion term is connected by the author 
with a specified range of discretion for the executive body applying law. In the case 
of judicial discretion, the term is wide and “involves the right to make decisions 
which are not directly stated in the legal text, wherewith it is of no importance what 
law application stage these decisions concern”35. I do not, however, understand this 
term as a legal body’s limitless freedom to decide36.
A court bailiff’s discretion, understood in such a way, is inseparably associ-
ated in the law application process with the model of practical, that is operative, 
32 See L. Leszczyński, Model decyzyjny procesu stosowania prawa, [in:] A. Korybski, L. Lesz-
czyński, Stanowienie i stosowanie prawa. Elementy teorii, Warszawa 2015, pp. 147–148.
33 See A. Marciniak, Sądowe postępowanie egzekucyjne, Warszawa 2013, p. 126.
34 See N. Isaacs, The limits of judicial discretion, “Yale Law Journal”1923, Vol. 32, https://
digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/ylj/vol32/iss4/2 [access: 29.12.2019]; R.M. Dworkin, The Model of 
Rules, https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/3609 [access: 29.12.2019]; J. Raz, Legal 
Principles and the Limits of Law, “Yale Law Journal” 1972, Vol. 81, https://digitalcommons.law.
yale.edu/ylj/vol81/iss5/2 [access: 29.12.2019]; B. Wojciechowski, Dyskrecjonalność sędziowska. 
Studium teoretycznoprawne, Toruń 2004; W. Staśkiewicz, T. Stawecki, Dyskrecjonalność w prawie, 
Warszawa 2010; Dyskrecjonalna władza sędziego. Zagadnienia teorii i praktyki, red. M. Dębiński, 
R. Pelewicz, T. Rakoczy, Tarnobrzeg 2012; A. Kotowski, Dyskrecjonalność władzy administracyjnej 
– próba nowego ujęcia, „Krytyka Prawa” 2014, t. 6, pp. 51–77.
35 See Z. Czarnik, Prawotwórcza rola sądu a dyskrecjonalność sędziowska, [in:] Dyskrecjonalna 
władza sędziego…, p. 16.
36 In my opinion, connecting such decision-making discretion with the two basic elements, 
described by A. Kotowski (op. cit., p. 64) as “unconscious pre-comprehension” and “conscious 
overdetermination”, is a right supplement to this meaning.
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interpretation of law, which is connected with the process leading to making and 
issuing the final decision37. In agreement with J. Wróblewski: “The operative in-
terpretation can be described as a practice of law-applying bodies”38. This author 
views it also as an indispensable element of the law application process which 
influences the content of a decision made39. From the perspective of the judicial 
enforcement proceedings (especially a court bailiff as a law-applying body), ac-
cording to L. Leszczyński40, the two features typical of the operative model of law 
interpretation will be particularly useful.
Firstly, the focus is on discretion – the context of interpretation related to de-
cision-making41 – which means that it is an “element of the decision-making pro-
cess”42. The scope of discretion in the process of enforcement of a judicial decision 
is determined by a list of actions (enforcement actions43) taken by a court bailiff. 
It means that specific enforcement actions (especially decision-making actions44) 
are preceded by the process of looking for the legal basis of such an action. Other 
consequences of this reasoning are no longer the main concern of the operating 
subject (a court bailiff).
Secondly, the focus is on “situationality” that is the element related to the 
interpretational situation, determined primarily by parallel establishment of the 
factual state45. Situationality in this sense significantly influences the borders of 
operative reasoning, the aim of which is to interpret this fragment of a norm (the 
normative basis of a decision) which is connected with the factual state46 (at this 
stage with the enforcement law-based factual state). This is also important from 
37 The model of operative interpretation of law has been discussed many times in the Polish 
theoretical law literature. See L. Leszczyński, Wykładnia operatywna (podstawowe właściwości), 
„Państwo i Prawo” 2009, z. 6, pp. 11–23; idem, Wykładnia prawa – model ogólny, [in:] A. Kalisz, 
L. Leszczyński, B. Liżewski, Wykładnia prawa. Model ogólny a perspektywa Europejskiej Konwencji 
Praw Człowieka i Prawa Unii Europejskiej, Lublin 2011, pp. 13–31; A. Szot, L. Leszczyński, Wykład-
nia operatywna prawa. Perspektywa teoretyczna i dogmatyczna, Toruń 2017; M. Zieliński, Wybrane 
zagadnienia wykładni prawa, „Państwo i Prawo” 2009, z. 6, pp. 3–10; J. Wróblewski, An Outline 
of a General Theory of Legal interpretation and constitutional interpretation, „Acta Universitatis 
Lodziensis. Folia Iuridica” 1987, Vol. 32, pp. 42–55.
38 See J. Wróblewski, Rozumienie prawa i jego wykładnia, Warszawa 1990, p. 74.
39 See idem, Sądowe stosowanie prawa, Warszawa 1988, p. 112.
40 See L. Leszczyński, Wykładnia prawa…, pp. 15–16.
41 See idem, Wykładnia operatywna…, p. 13.
42 See J. Wróblewski, Sądowe stosowanie…, p. 112. It should be noticed that the explanation 
of meanings of doubtful provisions is not the most important in this type of interpretation, but this 
process is not overlooked in this type of reasoning, either.
43 More on this subject A. Marciniak, op. cit., p. 124 ff.
44 Examples can be court bailiff’s actions in the form of a decision on suspension or discontin-
uation of enforcement proceedings, e.g. Articles 818, 819, 824 and 825 of the Civil Procedure Code.
45 See L. Leszczyński, Wykładnia prawa…, p. 15 ff.
46 Ibidem, p. 16.





the perspective of speed as one of the basic values of the judicial enforcement law 
(there is no need to reconstruct the entire enforcement norm)47.
My practice in the judicial enforcement proceedings and the analysis of jus-
tification of the selected judgements of the Supreme Court in enforcement cases 
convinces me to apply the rule omnia sunt interpretanda48 at the reconstruction of an 
enforcement norm to be applied, and hence to depart from the clarification approach 
to the interpretation defined by a legal maxim clara non sunt interpretanda. For 
accomplishment of the purpose and function of judicial enforcement, the linguistic 
directives of interpretation turn out to be insufficient for application in the process 
of reconstruction of a norm. In my opinion, the reasoning should be supplemented 
with the conclusions drawn from the extralinguistic rules, including in particular 
the results of systemic and extrasystemic directives (functional, purposive and 
axiological) to implement fully the principle of omnia sunt interpretanda in the 
operative interpretation of enforcement law49.
With such assumptions, one can eventually ask a question: Does a court bailiff, 
like a judge or an administrative body, have a specified range of discretion in the 
law application process? In general, the answer should be positive, especially in 
light of the new axiological basis. Discretion of an enforcement body becomes 
a real tool to settle complicated enforcement cases, which should be conducive to 
a good decision50.
In the course of action, a bailiff faces many decisions and these made by him 
or her must be good. What does it mean – a good decision?51 Article 1 of the Court 
Bailiff Act indicates the factors which make a decision good. They are efficiency, 
effectiveness, reliability52.
In Poland, bailiffs’ actions are always supervised by the court. This doesn’t 
mean that the court directly controls every step of a bailiff. He or she acts upon 
his or her own decisions which must lead to effective execution of an enforceable 
title. So, what about bailiffs’ discretion? Nowadays, a bailiff can decide what kind 
47 Limitation of the scope of interpretation (to a fragment of an enforcement norm) helps coping 
with protraction of enforcement proceedings. Cf. idem, Wykładnia operatywna…, p. 15 ff.
48 The principle of omnia sunt interpretanda is increasingly applied also in theoretical law 
literature concerning interpretation. See M. Zieliński, Wykładnia prawa. Zasady, reguły, wskazówki, 
Warszawa 2008, passim. Cf. M. Zieliński, M. Zirk-Sadowski, Klaryfikacyjność i derywacyjność 
w integrowaniu polskich teorii wykładni, „Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny” 2011, 
nr 2; L. Leszczyński, Wykładnia prawa…, p. 22.
49 See A. Korybski, L. Leszczyński, op. cit., p. 154.
50 On a good decision in actions of the public administration, see W. Dziedziak, O dyskrecjonal-
ności administracji publicznej w procesach stosowania prawa, „Studia Iuridica Lublinensia” 2017, 
Vol. 26(3), DOI: https://doi.org/10.17951/sil.2017.26.3.25, 2017, pp. 25–45.
51 See ibidem, p. 35: “An official should take good decisions, and a decision is an act of choice, 
intellect and will. This decision should serve the good of a human being”.
52 See Article 1 (5) of the Court Bailiff Act. See also T. Barankiewicz, op. cit.
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of actions should be taken against a debtor, but he or she must remember that all 
steps taken cannot be excessively harmful to the debtor, and they have to comply 
with the basic rules, like the clauses I have discussed before.
I believe two areas of bailiff’s discretion can be suggested. The first one is the 
area of wide discretion because an enforcement officer decides which steps to take 
dealing with each individual case.
As far as I am concerned, bailiff’s discretion depends on the nature of a case. 
There are a number of actions taken and decided by a bailiff. They can vary de-
pending on the character of the proceedings. They are different for pecuniary issues 
(however, a “mode of execution that is the least troublesome for the debtor must 
be always followed” – Article 799 § 1 sentence 4 of the Civil Procedure Code) and 
non-pecuniary issues, as they can entail different enforcement steps. It is deter-
mined by the executive body whether a case should be dropped when ineffectual 
due to lack of assets (here we deal with estimations, wealth rate – determining such 
elements as enforcement fees, case costs and debtor’s wealth). When enforcement 
costs exceed debtor’s possessions, the case should be dropped in accordance with 
Article 824 § 1 item 3 of the Civil Procedure Code.
The other area is when discretion is completely limited simply by direct court 
orders – Article 759 § 2 of the Civil Procedure Code (“The court issues ex officio 
orders to a bailiff to ensure proper execution and removes infringements noticed. 
Legal opinions given by the court in the orders issued are binding on the bailiff”)53.
There should be no problem with distinguishing between these two areas of en-
forcement officer’s discretion, but let’s ask ourselves: Is there anything in between? 
The answer may be the cases that get complicated during the course of action. A sit-
uation, for example, when a debtor hides his or her real assets (like a car, cash, other 
material goods). In such cases, bailiff’s discretion is not limited but changed. Bailiff 
is forced to adjust his or her actions and, at the same time, he or she must turn to 
a creditor, explain all new facts to him or her and cooperate more strongly with him 
or her. The enforcement officer’s actions depend now on the creditor’s decisions. 
Bailiff still operates within his or her discretion, however, in “new” conditions.
CONCLUSION
In my opinion, the scope of bailiff’s discretion is really wide, but let’s remem-
ber that it is completely different from judicial discretion. Whereas judges appeal 
to extra legal factors (like social norms, moral rules) in their decisions, refer to 
general clauses, legal principles and precedential practice, bailiffs rather use them 
53 There are also situations when bailiff’s discretion is limited not by the court order but the law. 
An example here is the fact of debtor’s death which forces the bailiff to suspend his or her proceedings.





as mental indicators54. Judges and bailiffs operate at different stages of law appli-
cation. Bailiff’s work is usually seen as the final stage, however, this position does 
not deprive him or her of discretion. I personally feel that bailiff’s discretion gives 
a lot of freedom in his or her actions, but we must also remember that a bailiff is 
not a freelancer but an official. All actions taken by him or her are laid down in law.
Currently, bailiff’s discretion is supplemented with the clauses of “public inter-
est” and “justice interest” and surely they contribute to the discretion limitations. 
The introduction of these two clauses has completely changed the Polish axiology 
of judicial enforcement law and it will take time to see how all these will influence 
bailiff’s discretion and if its limitations will become wider.
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STRESZCZENIE
W artykule autor skoncentrował się na trzech zagadnieniach teoretyczno-filozoficznych sądowego 
prawa egzekucyjnego w Polsce związanych z wejściem w życie z dniem 1 stycznia 2019 r. nowych 
ustaw komorniczych. W pierwszej kolejności przedstawiono sądowe postępowanie egzekucyjne jako 
element procesu stosowania prawa. Wymiar aksjologiczny tego prawa, miejsce i funkcja komornika 
sądowego w procesie stosowania prawa oraz wprowadzenie generalnych klauzul odsyłających w ze-
stawieniu z podstawowymi wartościami sądowego prawa egzekucyjnego w postaci skuteczności, 
sprawności i rzetelności kształtują nowy obraz sądowego prawa egzekucyjnego. Po drugie, podjęto 
problematykę generalnej klauzuli odsyłającej jako „nośnika” kryteriów pozaprawnych, która w no-
wym prawie komorniczym zajmuje ważne miejsce w procesie stosowania prawa egzekucyjnego. 
Szczególna w tym rola klauzul „interesu publicznego” i „dobra wymiaru sprawiedliwości” jako 
konstrukcji normatywnej wprowadzonej przez ustawodawcę do egzekucji sądowej. Po trzecie, pod-
jęto próbę odpowiedzi na pytanie o obecność oraz ewentualną granicę dyskrecjonalności (swobody 
decyzyjnej) komornika sądowego w warunkach nowej aksjologii prawa egzekucyjnego, a w szcze-
gólności formułowanie tego zagadnienia w procesie operatywnej wykładni prawa dokonywanej 
przez komornika sądowego.
Słowa kluczowe: aksjologia prawa; sądowe prawo egzekucyjne; proces stosowania prawa; klauzula 
generalna; interes publiczny; dobro wymiaru sprawiedliwości; dyskrecjonalność komornika
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